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A CAUTIONARY TALE ON ARBITRAL AUTHORITY:
JUDGES, ARBITRATORS AND THE STOLT-NIELSEN DECISION
By
William W. Park*
I.

PARCEL TANKERS AND ANTI-TRUST
Few matters prove as slippery as the allocation of tasks between judges

and arbitrators in commercial disputes. A choice to arbitrate implicates waiver of
access to otherwise competent courts in favor of adjudication which is both private
and binding. Respect for this bargain means that judges should not normally
disturb an arbitrator’s substantive conclusions.
Unlike the merits of a dispute itself, however, an arbitrator’s jurisdiction
must necessarily fall within the province of judicial review. No reason exists for a
court to defer to arbitrators on matters never given to them for decision. Courts
understandably hesitate to enforce decisions by arbitrators who have clearly
ignored the contours of their mandate.
This sensible delineation of tasks inheres in most modern arbitration
statutes, including the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which empowers courts to
vacate awards “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.”1 Award annulment
would not be appropriate, however, simply because a judge disagrees with the
award on questions of law or fact submitted to arbitration.2
This division of labor has been put into question by the recent decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds.3 The case arose
from actions for price-fixing against several ship owners by customers who had

*

Professor of Law, Boston University. President, London Court of International
Arbitration. General Editor, Arbitration International. Copyright © 2011, William W.
Park.
1
9 U.S.C. §10(a)(4) (1925).
2
With respect to foreign awards, Article V of the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention
applies a similar principle, denying recognition if the arbitration agreement was “not valid”
or the award contains decisions “beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.”
3
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
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chartered vessels commonly known as “Parcel Tankers” to transport liquids such
as food oils and chemicals. The customers alleged that the owners had engaged in
anti-competitive practices.4 All of the charter parties included similar arbitration
clauses.
The customers requested a single consolidated proceeding to address their
combined claims, known as “class action arbitration” borrowing a term from
American court procedures.5 They may have felt that such proceedings would
permit them to muster greater legal firepower and to reduce legal costs to the level
of making the litigation worthwhile.6 Not surprisingly, the ship owners preferred a
divide and conquer litigation strategy.

4

In a companion criminal case, Stolt-Nielsen itself had admitted to engaging in an illegal
cartel. In exchange, the Department of Justice granted amnesty. In 2003, however, the
Department of Justice attempted to renegotiate the deal, claiming Stolt-Nielsen had failed
to take corrective action. In 2007, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the
Department of Justice could not withdraw its bargain once Stolt-Nielsen executives had
relinquished their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. United States v. StoltNielsen, S.A., 524 F. Supp. 2d 586 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
5
Although slightly misleading in the context of arbitration, the term “class action
arbitration” is now widely used to describe consolidated arbitration proceedings. In a true
class action, under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a small number of
plaintiffs is “certified” to represent a larger class of plaintiffs who have substantially
similar claims, whether they know it or not. By contrast, in Stolt-Nielsen there was no
attempt to join parties who had not signed arbitration agreements with each other. In
essence, the term is used as another way to describe consolidation of related claims and
counterclaims which implicate different parties, all of whom have agreed to arbitration
with each other on a bilateral basis, if not necessarily in a group proceeding. Herein, “class
action arbitration” and “class arbitration” will be used interchangeably to refer to
consolidation of arbitral proceedings. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at
1764-65.
6
During the arbitration proceeding, counsel for AnimalFeeds argued that the claims against
Stolt-Nielsen were “negative value” claims that would cost more to litigate than could be
recovered in case of a victory. Transcript of Arbitration, at 82a-83a, Stolt-Nielsen v.
AnimalFeeds. Rightly or wrongly, Justice Ginsburg in her dissent suggested that “only a
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.” See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1783 (quoting Carnegie v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)). One can only speculate on the
effect of this “negative value” on the settlement reached between Stolt-Nielsen and
AnimalFeeds on 26 October 2010, when the District Court for the District of Connecticut
approved AnimalFeeds’ voluntary dismissal of its claim. See generally, ROBERT G. BONE,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Foundation Press, 2003).
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After a district court had ordered consolidation of the related actions,7 the

parties agreed to constitute a tribunal pursuant to the American Arbitration
Association’s Supplementary Rules on Class Arbitration (“AAA Supplementary
Rules”) to address whether the various arbitrations could and should be
consolidated.8 In a partial award, the arbitrators construed the arbitration clause to
permit class arbitration, which might be ordered at a subsequent stage upon a
finding of certain prerequisites, such as common questions of law and fact among
the class members. That path must have seemed conducive to a more efficient
process, with savings in time and cost from grouping related claims into a single
case.
II.

CONSOLIDATION AND EXCESS OF AUTHORITY

A.

The Majority Decision
The asserted efficiencies in class arbitration, with savings from combined

claims, did not impress the ship owners, who sought to vacate the award for excess
of authority. Ultimately a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
arbitrators had exceeded their authority by imposing personal policy views, rather
than deciding pursuant to applicable law.9 The Court based its conclusion on a
7

See In re Parcel Tanker Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1370,
1370-71 (J.P.M.L. 2003).
8
AnimalFeeds brought the claim on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated in a
putative class action under FRCP Rule 23 against Stolt-Nielsen, Odfjell, Jo Tankers, and
Tokyo Marine. Id. at 1371; FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
9
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court was authored by Justice Alito, joined by
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Alito wrote:
It is only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and
application of the agreement and effectively ‘dispense[s] his own
brand of industrial justice’ that his decision may be unenforceable.
In that situation, an arbitration decision may be vacated under §
10(a)(4) of the FAA on the ground that the arbitrator ‘exceeded
[his] powers,’ for the task of an arbitrator is to interpret and
enforce a contract, not to make public policy. In this case, we must
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somewhat unusual feature of the case, which was a post-dispute stipulation
concluded by the parties confirming that their contracts were silent on the matter of
class action arbitrations, in the sense that “no agreement” had been reached.
Significantly, the Court did not say that parties must agree explicitly to
class arbitration, but simply that the case at bar implicated no agreement, whether
express or implied.10 The majority held only that the ship owners’ right not to be
subject to consolidated proceedings trumped any efficiency benefits from class
arbitration, including the avoidance of costs that might otherwise discourage
pursuit of claims.
B.

The Political Context
The decision divided the Court sharply along political lines. A vigorous

dissent by the more liberal Court members argued that the arbitrators were simply
doing what the parties had instructed them.11 The dissent pointed out that in
accepting the AAA Supplementary Rules, the litigants had agreed to empower
arbitrators to decide whether the dispute should proceed on a class action basis.12
The political dimensions of the case resist simple analysis. American
conclude that what the arbitration panel did was simply to impose
its own view of sound policy regarding class arbitration.
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1767-1768.
10
See id. at 1776 n.10 (“We have no occasion to decide what contractual basis may support
a finding that the parties agreed to authorize class-action arbitration”).
11
Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens. Justice
Sotomayor took no part in the Supreme Court’s decision, having been on the Second
Circuit when the case was on appeal. Id. at 1766-67. However, Justice Sotomayor did
agree with Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer later that term, joining a dissent in RentA-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2781-88 (2010), another case addressing
arbitral jurisdiction.
12
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1777. Rule 3 of these AAA Supplementary Rules grants the
arbitrators jurisdiction to determine whether the arbitration might, as a matter of contract,
proceed on behalf of a class, assuming satisfaction of the relevant criteria for class
certification set forth in Rule 4, which parallel factors in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, AAA’s Supplementary Rules for
Class Arbitration Rules 3 & 4, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936 (last
visited March 20, 2011); FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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conservatives tend to favor arbitration as a process in line with freedom of
contract. Yet their preferences get reversed for class proceedings, which appear as
an anti-business tool of plaintiffs’ lawyers fomenting litigation on a contingency
fee basis.
In contrast, liberal justices often express skepticism of arbitration, seen as
a device to sidestep the perceived safeguards of a civil jury.13 Those same justices,
however, seem to perceive class proceedings as a pro-consumer mechanism
permitting multiple litigants to engage a legal team on an economical basis,
permitting pursuit of the claims as a practical matter.14

III.

THE RIGHT ANSWER TO THE WRONG QUESTION

A.

The Second Agreement
In its zeal to send a signal on the admittedly problematic nature of class

action arbitration, the majority conflated two distinct matters. The first relates to
monitoring arbitral jurisdiction, which falls to courts. The second concerns
substantive merits of the parties’ dispute, which falls to arbitrators.15
13

Liberal doubts about arbitration are not new. See e.g., the dissent by Justice Stevens in
the landmark Mitsubishi case allowing arbitration of anti-trust claims in an international
context. Stevens wrote, “Consideration of a fully developed record by a jury, instructed in
the law by a federal judge, and subject to appellate review, is a surer guide to the
competitive character of a commercial practice than the practically unreviewable judgment
of a private arbitrator.” Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 666
(1985).
14
The vogue for protecting consumers from arbitration in the United States can be seen in
the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) which invalidates (or in some cases permits invalidation of)
pre-dispute arbitration agreements in cases with deemed imbalances in bargaining power.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376-2223. If enacted, the pending Arbitration Fairness Act would yield similar
results on a broader scale. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong.
(2009). See also Department of Defense Regulation Restricting the Use of Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements, 48 C.F.R. §§ 212, 222 & 252 (2010).
15
See generally, William W. Park, The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction to Determine
Jurisdiction, in 13 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 55 (Albert Jan Van Den Berg ed., 2007).
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The opinion by Justice Alito rightly noted the parties’ post-dispute
stipulation that the contract was silent in the sense of containing “no agreement”
on class action arbitration. However, the litigants had unequivocally asked
arbitrators, not judges to construe their ex ante intent on class arbitration.16 Article
3 of the AAA Supplementary Rules, titled “Construction of the Arbitration
Clause,” provides the arbitrators with an explicit grant of jurisdiction as follows:
Upon appointment, the arbitrator shall determine as a
threshold matter, in a reasoned, partial final award on the
construction of the arbitration clause, whether the applicable
arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf
of or against a class (the "Clause Construction Award").17
The arbitrators were thus empowered by the parties to address whether the
arbitration clause permitted the case to proceed on behalf of a class.18 The litigants
moved that question to the realm of the dispute’s substance, which under the FAA
normally remains within the purview of the arbitrators.
In essence, the majority gave the right answer to the wrong question. The
relevant inquiry facing the Court was not, “What did the parties agree in general?”
but the more limited issue, “What did the parties agree to arbitrate?” By accepting
the AAA Supplementary Rules, the parties gave to the arbitrators the question of
whether the contract allowed class action arbitration, thus generally precluding
16

Brief in Opposition at 2, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758,
1768 (2010).
17
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 12. Moreover, Rule 3 recognizes
that such a determination will be considered an award subject to review pursuant to the
delineated grounds for vacatur, but no more, as provided in the FAA. The Rule continues,
“The arbitrator shall stay all proceedings following the issuance of the Clause Construction
Award for a period of at least 30 days to permit any party to move a court of competent
jurisdiction to confirm or to vacate the Clause Construction Award.” The point of Rule 3 is
to construe the contract, as a threshold matter, to determine whether the parties agreed to
submit their dispute to class arbitration at all.
18
The applicability of these AAA procedures was explicitly recognized by the majority.
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765.
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judicial second-guessing on that matter. Courts might still intervene to monitor
bias or lack of due process, but not to correct a simple mistake in the arbitrators’
contract interpretation.
Thus the chief mischief of Stolt-Nielsen lies in its potential to decrease the
finality of commercial arbitration, defeating the parties’ aim that their dispute be
decided by arbitrators rather than courts. Few would disagree that arbitrators must
remain faithful to the parties’ contract, not create new public policy.19
Unfortunately, the majority opinion took that general proposition as an avenue to
justify award annulment simply because the arbitrators got it wrong on a question
submitted for their determination.
B.

Substantive Merits vs. Arbitral Authority
In holding that the award should be vacated, the majority invoked excess

of authority by the arbitral tribunal, one of the limited statutory grounds for vacatur
under the FAA.20 Under the facts of the case, however, the Court may well have
blurred the distinction between excess of jurisdiction and simple mistake of law,
dressing the latter in the garb of the former.
True enough, articulating a robust definition of excess of authority has
often proved tenuous.21 On the basis that litigants do not expressly empower
19

The Stolt-Nielsen majority opinion at 1767-68 declared that the award must be vacated
because the tribunal simply “impose[d] its own view of sound policy regarding class
arbitration.”
20
The exclusivity of the FAA as the source for vacatur grounds was declared by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
21
Attempts to define jurisdiction sometimes bring to mind the line by U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Potter Stewart, admitting an inability to define "hard core" obscenity but adding, "I
know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring), examining when erotic expression falls outside the limits of Constitutionally
protected speech in the context of a Louis Malle film Les Amants about a woman in an
unhappy marriage. British judges sometimes apply a less risqué characterization test. In
deciding that a floating crane was not a "ship or vessel" for purposes of insurance policy,
Lord Justice Scrutton referred to the gentleman who "could not define an elephant but
knew what it was when he saw one." Merchants Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. v. North of
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arbitrators to make mistakes, at least one judge has gone so far as to suggest that
errors always constitute an excess of authority.22
Such a stretch, however, ignores that the parties asked an arbitrator, not a
judge, to decide the case, thus assuming the risk that the arbitrator might get it
wrong. Nothing in the FAA permits judges to impose their own views on matters
submitted to arbitration. The integrity of the arbitral process requires not only that
judges scrutinize gateway questions related to the contours of the litigants’
agreement to arbitrate, but equally that courts respect the arbitrators’ decisions on
issues given to them for adjudication.
In this context, one may recall words used from an earlier U.S Supreme
Court decision addressing a dispute between a New York merchant and an Illinois
store owner before arbitrators who ultimately awarded damages to the ill-treated
storekeeper. Having lost in arbitration, the unhappy New Yorker succeeded in
having the award set aside by a lower court. The Supreme Court reversed with the
following reasoning:
If the award is within the submission, and contains the
honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing
of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error,
either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a
substitution of the judgment of the chancellor [the judiciary]
in place of the judges chosen by the parties [the arbitrators],
England Protecting & Indemnity Association, [1926] 26 Lloyd's Rep. 201, at 203, 32 Com.
Cases 165, at 172, 43 T.L.R. 107 (Court of Appeal).
22
The great English jurist Lord Denning once suggested (albeit in an administrative
context) that “Whenever a tribunal goes wrong in law it goes outside the jurisdiction
conferred on it and its decision is void.” See LORD DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF THE LAW
74 (1979). See also Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School, [1978] 3
W.L.R. 736, 743 (A.C.)("The distinction between an error which entails absence of
jurisdiction and an error made within jurisdiction is [so] fine . . . that it is rapidly being
eroded."). Happily for the health of English law, the House of Lords in 2005 rejected this
position a year ago in the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impreglio SpA
[2005] UKHL 43.
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and would make an award the commencement, not the end,
of litigation.23

To extend jurisdictional analysis further than allowed pursuant to the FAA would
permit any unhappy loser in a fair proceeding to renege on the bargain to arbitrate
simply when a decision proves not to their liking.
There is nothing odd in saying that parties express their intent to arbitrate
matters which might otherwise be jurisdictional in nature. For example, allegations
that the signature in an arbitration clause had been forged would normally give rise
to a judicial review. Yet it would always be up to the parties to agree that the
allegation of forgery should be arbitrated,24 in which case the arbitrator would be
the one to determine the genuineness of the signature.25
At some point, of course, arbitrators might simply invent a legal standard
informed only by their personal policy preferences.26 In such an instance, they
23

Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1855).
With respect to the very existence of an agreement to arbitrate (such as raised by the
allegations of forgery), a separate post-dispute agreement to arbitrate would normally be
needed to confer arbitral jurisdiction. By contrast, with respect to procedural matters (such
as respect for time limits) the parties might well confer arbitral authority in a single
contract containing a clear mandate for arbitrate. See Howsam v. Dean Witter, 537 U.S. 79
(2002) (addressing the right to interpret a requirement that arbitration be filed within six
years after “the occurrence or event giving rise to the dispute”).
25
Such delegation of jurisdictional authority in a separate agreement is exactly what
happened in Astro Valiente Compania Naviera v. Pakistan Ministry of Food & Agriculture
(The Emmanuel Colocotronis No. 2), [1982], 1 All E. R. 823, [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 286
(QB, Commercial Court) where buyers of wheat refused to arbitrate a dispute with the
shipper on the theory that the arbitration clause in the charter party had not been
incorporated in the bill of lading. The parties submitted to ad hoc arbitration the question of
whether the arbitration clause was incorporated into the bill of lading, and were
subsequently held to be bound by an award finding that the buyers had agreed to arbitrate
based on language in the bill of lading providing “All other conditions … as per ... charter
party.”
26
The sting in the majority’s vacatur of the award lies in the line, “what the arbitration
panel did was simply to impose its own view of sound policy regarding class arbitration.”
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767-68. However, a
thoughtful observer might give serious consideration to the accuracy of the majority’s
view. Justice Ginsberg in her dissent notes that the tribunal did in fact tie its conclusion “to
New York law, federal maritime law, and decisions made by other panels pursuant to Rule
24
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would be exceeding their authority. The facts of Stolt-Nielsen, however, do not
lend themselves to painting the arbitrators as such wild cards.27
It may well be that the majority’s aversion to forced joinder represents
sound policy.28 However, it was for the parties to adopt whatever path they
preferred for contract interpretation on this matter. Under the facts in Stolt-Nielsen,
the two sides asked arbitrators, not courts, to construe their agreement with respect
to class arbitration. The “no agreement” stipulation must be read in conjunction
with the post-dispute adoption of the AAA Supplementary Rules.
Although stressing that the award was not yet “ripe” for review, the
opinion by Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the effect of the agreement to apply the
AAA Supplementary Rules. Her dissent notes:
The parties' supplemental agreement, referring the class3 [of the AAA Supplementary Rules].” Id. at 1780 (citing Evans v. Famous Music Corp.,
807 N. E. 2d 869 (N.Y. 2004)).
27
In Stolt-Nielsen, the arbitrators’ understanding of the law was made on the basis of an
earlier U.S. Supreme Court decision in which a mere plurality of the Court held that
determinations on consolidation were for the arbitrators themselves. See Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). The legacy of this case was anything but clear. None
of the four opinions in Bazzle commanded a majority. The plurality felt that the arbitrator
should decide whether the parties’ agreement allowed for class action arbitration. Justice
Stevens concurred with the outcome but did not endorse its reasoning. The dissent by Chief
Justice Rehnquist argued that the parties’ contract demonstrated no consent to class action
arbitration. The dissent by Justice Thomas noted that the case originated before South
Carolina states courts, and contended that the FAA did not apply to state proceedings. In
the context of the point made by Justice Thomas, it is interesting that Stolt-Nielsen
implicated a maritime matter, falling within the purview of federal rather than state law.
28
In some instances non-signatories may be brought into proceedings on the basis of
findings of agency, or facts which justify piercing the corporate veil. See generally,
William W. Park, Non-Signatories and International Contract, in MULTIPLE PARTY
ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3 (Permanent Court of Arbitration, ed., 2009).
See Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co. v. Gov’t of Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46 for
a recent British decision on the matter. Although the British Supreme Court held that there
was no justification to join the government of Pakistan, an analogous decision by the Paris
Cour d’appel came to the opposite conclusion, dismissing a challenge to an award against
the state. See Cour d’appel de Paris, Feb. 17, 2011. The U.S. Supreme Court, of course, is
well aware of the various theories on which non-signatories might be joined in arbitration.
See Arthur Andersen v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009) (addressing notions of third party
beneficiaries).
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arbitration issue to an arbitration panel, undoubtedly
empowered the arbitrators to render their clause-construction
decision. That scarcely debatable point should resolve this
case.29

Put differently, the job of construing the contract’s scope on the matter of
consolidation had been expressly conferred on arbitrators, not judges.
The calculus for judicial intervention changes, however, if no subsequent
agreement exists to refer the matter to construction pursuant to the AAA
Supplementary Rules. Under the factual matrix of Stolt-Nielsen, everyone had in
fact signed arbitration agreements. In such circumstances, the dangers, milder in
magnitude when speaking in relative terms, were simply that arbitrators might
erroneously presume an intent to permit collective (rather than bilateral)
proceedings among entities that had already consented to renouncing their recourse
to courts. The greater disruption lurks in the possible extension of class
proceedings to include persons who never signed arbitration agreements at all,
most likely the next step for those who press to import true American-style class
proceedings into arbitration.30

29

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1780.
Statutory court-ordered consolidation of arbitral proceedings is a different matter, given
that all parties would presumably be subject to the relevant judicial jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, § 2A (2010), allowing consolidation as provided in the
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which in Rule 42 permits joinder of actions
“involving a common question of law or fact.” MASS. R. CIV. P. 42 (2008). The provision
was applied in New England Energy v. Keystone Shipping, 855 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988),
which held that a federal district court could grant consolidation pursuant to Massachusetts
state law where the parties’ agreement was silent on such matter. See also MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 90 § 7N1/2 (1998), requiring non-voluntary arbitration of claims over allegedly
defective vehicles. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3 (West 1978) (permitting
consolidation of arbitration proceedings that involve a “common issue or issues of law or
fact” but requiring that “separate arbitration agreements or proceedings exist between the
same parties; or that one party is a party to a separate arbitration agreement or proceeding
with a third party”), with Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain v. Boeing
Co., 998 F.2d 68, 69 (2d Cir. 1993) (limiting a court’s discretion to grant consolidation of
30
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Opt-in For Class Members
The AAA Supplementary Rules provide criteria for class certification,

setting forth factors that largely parallel those in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. If arbitrators have found that the contract permits class action
arbitration, they will proceed to determine whether the various proceedings should
go forward on a class basis. Pursuant to prerequisites in Article 4 of those
Supplementary Rules, one or more claimants may represent a class only if each of
the following conditions is met:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of separate
arbitrations on behalf of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class;
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class;
(5) counsel selected to represent the class will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class; and
(6) each class member has entered into an agreement
containing an arbitration clause which is substantially similar
to that signed by the class representative(s) and each of the
other class members.
A careful observer will note that the final prerequisite, Rule 4(6), speaks of each
class member having entered into an agreement containing an arbitration clause
substantially similar to the one signed by the class representative. On its face, such
arbitration proceedings arising from separate agreements “absent the parties’ agreement to
allow such consolidation”).
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language seems to leave open the prospect that a company which never had an
arbitration clause with the ship owners might become part of the arbitration
through a unilateral post-dispute “opt-in” process. Lacking reciprocity, such a
mechanism seems to derogate from the abecedarian principle that arbitration
(unlike court proceedings) presupposes consent.
Under the facts of Stolt-Nielsen, all owners and all customers had agreed
to arbitrate with each other through clauses in the charter-parties.31 Consolidation
simply moved things from bilateral to multilateral proceedings, without deeming
into life an agreement to arbitrate where none had existed.
The calculus for class arbitration, however, would change dramatically if a
unilateral “opt-in” process were to bring into the arbitration potential claimants
with which respondents had never concluded any arbitration agreement at all.
Like marriage, commercial arbitration implicates mutual consent, not an openended option to be exercised by a host of partners.32
IV.

LOOKING FORWARD
Speculation about the effect of Stolt-Nielsen remains a daunting task. If

arbitration scholars could predict the future they would likely be in another
business.33
Although the peculiar facts of Stolt-Nielsen limit its precedential value,34
the reasoning is sure to be pressed into service to justify award annulment in cases
31

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765.
A different analysis applies to proceedings based on bilateral investment treaties and free
trade agreements, where host states provide standing offers to arbitrate with potential
investors.
33
One recollects the whimsical comment attributed to French Resistance leader, Pierre
Dac, that prediction remains difficult particularly when it concerns the future: “La
prévision est difficile surtout lorsqu’elle concerne l’avenir.” For a more systematic
treatment of the unforeseeable nature of history. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE
BLACK SWAN (2007).
34
The decision rests on an explicit “no agreement” stipulation not likely to be repeated if
the parties resisting class arbitration have competent counsel. See S. I. Strong, Opening
32
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where judges differ with arbitrators on the substantive outcome of a case. Indeed,
by ignoring the litigants’ agreement to arbitrate whether class proceedings were
authorized, the decision raises the prospect that arbitration will become mere
foreplay to litigation.
To make matters worse, the majority provides little if any guidance on
factors that might demonstrate the parties’ intent to permit class arbitration. In a
key footnote, the majority punts to future decisions the important question of how
to define the contours of an agreement to class action proceedings, stating “We
have no occasion to decide what contractual basis may support a finding that the
parties agreed to authorize class-action arbitration.”35
Apart from sowing confusion on the allocation of tasks between judges
and arbitrators, the case leaves a legacy of other open questions. The Court fails to
address the much vexed matter of whether “manifest disregard of the law”
continues to exist as an independent ground for review of arbitral awards.

36

Instead, the decision says only that if such a standard exists, it was satisfied under
the facts of the Stolt-Nielsen,37 thus leaving the vitality of the doctrine open to
question.38

More Doors than it Closes, 2010 LLOYD’S MAR. & CONSUMER L.Q. 565 (Nov. 2010) for a
scholarly perspective on the effect of Stolt-Nielsen in future cases.
35
See Stolt-Nielsen 130 S. Ct. at 1782, n.10.
36
First introduced in dictum of the 1953 U. S. Supreme Court decision Wilko v. Swann,
“manifest disregard of the law” has raised considerable concern in some quarters. See, e.g.,
the opinion by Chief Judge Posner in Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d
704, 706 (7 Cir. 1994), which refers to the doctrine as having been “[c]reated ex nihilo [as]
a nonstatutory ground for setting aside arbitral awards.” Judge Posner, continued: “If
[manifest disregard] is meant to smuggle review for clear error in by the back door, it is
inconsistent with the entire modern law of arbitration. If it is intended to be synonymous
with the statutory formula that it most nearly resembles-whether the arbitrators ‘exceeded
their powers’-it is superfluous and confusing.”
37
See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3: “We do not decide whether ‘manifest
disregard’ survives … as an independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the
enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.” The Court then continued,
“Assuming, arguendo, that such a standard applies, we find it satisfied for the reasons that
follow [in the majority opinion].”
38
Whether “manifest disregard of the law” exists as an independent ground for judicial
review of awards was put into doubt by the 2008 Supreme Court decision in Hall Street
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The majority opinion will likely provoke further politicization of

arbitration in the United States.39 The drama springs from two idiosyncrasies of
American legal culture. The first lies in the absence of any general nation-wide
statute to insulate consumers and employees from abusive arbitration
arrangements.40 The second rests in the availability of civil juries to decide
ordinary contract cases. Arbitration thus commends itself to those with doubts
about the reliability of such juries, often perceived as rendering unreasonable
verdicts tainted with bias against manufacturers and employers.
One of the next battlegrounds will implicate contractual waivers of class
action arbitration.41 In one federal appellate case, the court invalidated a waiver of
class action arbitration even after an earlier decision was remanded by the Supreme
Court for reconsideration in light of Stolt-Nielsen.42 The court maintained its view
that the waiver was invalid because it raised the cost of arbitration so as to
preclude plaintiffs from enforcing competition law.
Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). More recently, the Supreme Court passed up
another opportunity to consider “manifest disregard” in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London v. Lagstein, 607 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 832
(2010).
39
For the current state of controversy over the costs and benefits of arbitration in the
United States, readers are directed to the history of the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
H.R. 1020 & S. 931 (111th Congress, 1st Session). Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R.
1020, 111th Cong. (2009). and/or S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009).
40
See e.g., debate on Arbitration and Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020 & S. 931 (111th
Congress, 1st Session). The U.S. Congress, however, can and has passed legislation limiting
arbitration on behalf of special interest groups. See Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Act
of 2002, § 11028, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, 1835-36 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1226 (2000)), sometimes known as the Bono Bill in recognition of its original sponsor, the
late Sonny Bono. Recently, Senators Jeff Sessions and Russell Feingold proposed a bill
intended to provide broad protection of consumer interests, albeit perhaps of an overinclusive nature that sacrifices vital elements of party autonomy and efficient dispute
resolution. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223.
41
The effectiveness of waivers drafted to preclude recourse to class action arbitration is
currently before the U.S. Supreme Court in its review of a decision by the Federal Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 45 (2010).
Oral arguments heard on Nov. 9, 2010 explored whether the FAA preempts reliance on
state law related to unconscionability principles that might be invoked to strike down such
waivers.
42
See In Re Am. Express Merchants Litigation, 2011 WL 781698 (2d Cir. 2011).
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Such an approach leaves respondents in a difficult position. If a contract
contains a class action waiver, a judge would be unable to compel class
proceedings due to the decision in Stolt-Nielsen which requires agreement on the
matter. Yet the same judge might feel unable to grant a motion for non-class
arbitration, considering bilateral proceedings to be unconscionable because the cost
effectively denies claimant an ability to enforce statutory rights. Practitioners will
in any event focus more on drafting arbitration clauses,43 whether within the
framework of consumer and employment contracts or business-to-business
transactions.44
Finally, Stolt-Nielsen raises the question whether judges outside the United
States will stay court actions in conflict with class arbitration, particularly if
arbitrators allow unilateral “opt-in” by persons who had not previously agreed to
arbitrate.45 In the context of litigation in France or England, for example, it is far
from evident that a court would refuse to hear a claim merely because the
respondent, benefiting from no pre-existing arbitration agreement, had simply
opted into American class arbitration.
Whatever lessons might or might not be apparent from Stolt-Nielsen, the
case highlights tensions inherent in determining arbitral jurisdiction, as well as
political friction in connection with the role of arbitration in enhancing economic

43

See Paul Friedland & Michael Ottolenghi, Drafting Class Action Clauses After StoltNielsen, 65 DISP. RES. J. 22 (May-Oct. 2010), who suggest explicitly addressing the
question of class action arbitration in the arbitration clause to avoid any confusion resulting
from how future courts will interpret Stolt-Nielsen.
44
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent noted that the parties in Stolt-Nielsen were sophisticated
businesses with sufficient resources and experience to bargain, rather than parties subject to
contracts of adhesion. Whether this argument cuts in favor or against a presumption to
allow class action arbitration remains an open question. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1783.
45
See discussion supra of Rule 4(6) of the AAA Supplementary Class Arbitration, which
makes references to agreements by “each class member,” (i.e., the claimant) to enter the
arbitration, irrespective of any prior agreement to arbitrate with the respondent.
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cooperation. In large measure, resolution of these strains will depend on honest and
mature debate rather than ideology or dogma.46

46

See generally, William W. Park, Les devoirs de l’arbitre: ni un pour tous, ni tous pour
un, 2011 CAHIERS DE L’ARBITRAGE 13 (2011).

